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A decision analytical model was developed to inves-
tigate the cost-effectiveness of stockpiling antiviral (AV) 
drugs for a potential infl uenza pandemic in the United King-
dom and the possible role of near-patient testing in con-
serving AV drug stocks. Under base-case assumptions (in-
cluding a fi xed stockpile that was smaller than the clinical 
attack rate), the treat-only option (treating all symptomatic 
patients with AV drugs) would be considered cost-effec-
tive (£1,900–£13,700 per quality-adjusted life year [QALY] 
gained, depending on the fatality scenario), compared with 
no intervention (nonintervention but management of cases 
as they arise). The test-treat option (testing all symptomatic 
patients but treating those with positive tests results only) 
would result in moderate gains in QALYs over the treat-only 
option but at relatively large additional costs. Stockpiling 
suffi cient AV drugs (but not near-patient tests) to treat all pa-
tients with clinical cases would be cost-effective, provided 
AV drugs are effective at preventing deaths from pandemic 
infl uenza.
Many countries are ordering stockpiles of antiviral (AV) drugs for use in a potential infl uenza pandemic. 
The United Kingdom recently announced the procurement 
of 14.6 million courses of oseltamivir, enough for almost 
25% of the population (1).
The timing of an infl uenza pandemic cannot be pre-
dicted (the most recent pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957, 
and 1968/69). Because AV drugs have a limited shelf-life, 
long-term maintenance of stockpiles may constitute a sig-
nifi cant cost. Similarly, the size (clinical attack rate [CAR]) 
of a pandemic cannot be accurately foreseen. Therefore, 
triaging of patients with infl uenza-like illness (ILI) may 
be essential to conserve limited AV drug stocks. Possible 
triaging methods include near-patient testing (rapid diag-
nostic tests at the point of care). This study assessed the 
cost-effectiveness of stockpiling AV drugs for a potential 
infl uenza pandemic and, in the event of a pandemic, also 
assessed the use of near-patient testing in the management 
of AV drugs.  
Methods
A decision analytical model (Figure 1) was constructed 
to compare the costs and quality-adjusted life year (QALY) 
loss associated with 3 potential strategies for the manage-
ment of patients with ILI in the United Kingdom: 1) do not 
treat with AV drugs and manage complications if they arise 
(no intervention), 2) treat all patients with AV drugs (treat 
only), or 3) test then treat those who test positive for infl u-
enza with AV drugs (test-treat). Precision Tree (Palisade 
Corporation, Ithaca, NY, USA) running in Microsoft (Red-
mond, WA, USA)  Excel was used to construct the model 
and @Risk (Palisade Corporation) was used to perform the 
probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
Epidemiologic Scenarios
Baseline epidemiologic scenarios were based on the 
UK Department of Health Pandemic Contingency Plan (2), 
which assumes a cumulative CAR of 25% over 1 wave last-
ing 15 weeks. The demand on general practitioners (GPs) 
and accident and emergency departments (A&Es) would 
require an alternative means for AV drug distribution (2). 
Patients with ILI were therefore assumed to have received 
AV drug therapy by visiting teams or call-in centers. Of 
these, because of secondary complications, 5% were as-
sumed to have consulted further with a GP and 5% with 
A&E departments. Also, among ILI patients, 0.55% were 
expected to be hospitalized. All model parameters are 
summarized in the online Appendix Table (available from 
www.cdc.gov/EID/content/14/2/267-appT.htm). 
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Background ILI rates were deduced from the mean ILI 
consultation rates in England and Wales observed by GP-
based sentinel surveillance from 1985–2003 (4) and the es-
timated proportion (28%) of clinical ILI case-patients who 
consulted with GPs in interpandemic periods (5). Epidemic 
infl uenza is seasonal with a higher incidence in winter (wk 
40–12) than summer (wk 13–39). The mean weekly ILI 
incidence was assumed to have remained unchanged dur-
ing the pandemic, resulting in a cumulative incidence of 
3.1% (winter) or 1% (summer). An additional value of 4% 
for midwinter (wk 49–8) was also considered in the sensi-
tivity analyses. It is possible that a pandemic strain would 
out-compete the existing epidemic infl uenza strains and 
the background ILI rate would fall. However, other patho-
gens (e.g., respiratory syncytial virus and rhinovirus) that 
contribute to ILI would remain unaffected (22). The back-
ground ILI rate was therefore assumed to remain unaltered. 
The base-case analysis assumed a winter pandemic, giving 
a probability (PrF) of 89% (CAR/(CAR + background ILI 
rate) that a case of ILI was pandemic infl uenza . 
Two fatality scenarios were assumed, on the basis of 
the 1918 infl uenza pandemic (1918 scenario), which had an 
overall case-fatality ratio (CFR) of 2.3%, and the 1957 and 
1968/69 infl uenza pandemics (1957/69 scenario) which 
had an average CFR of 0.3%, with most deaths occurring 
in the elderly (online Appendix Table). 
Three pandemics occurred in the 20th century, which 
suggests that a pandemic occurs approximately every 30 
years but that this is a random (Poisson) process. For the 
base-case analysis, we assumed that the next pandemic 
would take place in 30 years; this fi gure was varied from 1 
to 50 years in the sensitivity analyses.
Antiviral Treatments
The neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir was selected 
as the AV treatment of choice because it is cheaper and 
easier to stockpile than zanamivir and has been shown to 
dominate zanamivir in cost-utility analyses (23). Cyclic 
amines (amantadine and rimantadine) were not considered 
because resistance to these drugs has emerged in infl uenza 
A virus (H5N1) with pandemic potential (24). The rate of 
adverse events after the use of neuraminidase inhibitors is 
low and therefore was not considered in this analysis (12).
Meta-analyses of oseltamivir effi cacy studies were 
compared, and the 2003 study by Kaiser et al. was selected 
for the parameterization of this model because it included 
the greatest number of subjects (5,15,20). No data were 
available for AV effi cacy in reducing infl uenza-related 
deaths so the same effi cacy as that for reducing infl uenza-
related hospitalizations was assumed. Assuming all GP and 
accident and emergency (A&E) consultations were attrib-
utable to the development of complications (2), the prob-
ability of complications and the probability of hospitaliza-
tions (given no AV therapy) were calculated by using the 
odds ratios from the oseltamivir meta-analyses (15). The 
probability of complications for noninfl uenza ILI patients 
was considered the same as for untreated infl uenza patients, 
but the probability of hospitalization for noninfl uenza ILI 
patients was considered to be 40% that of untreated infl u-
enza patients (15).
We assumed that for both the treat-only and test-treat 
strategies all qualifying patients were given AV drugs and 
were tested until the stockpile ran out. No epidemiologic 
differences were assumed between those who received AV 
drugs and those who did not because the stockpile was de-
pleted. Neuraminidase inhibitors are only recommended for 
use within 48 hours of symptom onset (25). We assumed 
that the effi ciency of AV drug distribution would be such 
that 70% of ILI patients would receive timely AV drugs; 
this varied from 30% to 97% in our sensitivity analyses 
(online Appendix Table). Those receiving AV drugs after 
48 hours were assumed to derive no benefi t.
The shelf-life of oseltamivir is currently 5 years. How-
ever, tests are being conducted to increase this to 6 years 
(6). Shelf-life was varied in our sensitivity analyses be-
tween 4 and 6 years.
For base-case analyses, we assumed the AV drug 
stockpile to be 14.6 million courses (1), giving an 87% 
probability of case-patients receiving AV drugs (size of 
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Figure 1. Decision analytical model tree of treatment strategies 
for patients with an infl uenza-like illness (ILI) during an infl uenza 
pandemic. All branches culminate in the subtree (indicated with +). 
QALY, quality-adjusted life year; CAR, clinical attack rate.
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stockpile/total ILI cases). Hence, the size of the AV stock-
pile would be limited under the treat-only strategy.
Near-Patient Tests
A number of near-patient infl uenza tests are currently 
available (7–10). To refl ect the continual improvement in 
test technology, a composite test was constructed based on 
the best performance of currently available tests (89.5% 
sensitivity and 99.8% specifi city) (Directigen Flu A+B, 
Becton Dickinson, Sparks, MD, USA) (7,12), a shelf-life 
of 2 years (Quickvue, Quidel Corporation, San Diego, 
CA,USA) (9), and a cost of £7 per test (Biostar Flu OIA, 
Inverness Medical-Biostar Inc, Louisville, CO, USA) (8). 
Parameter distributions for test sensitivity and specifi city 
were deduced from a meta-analysis of near-patient tests 
(12), but distributions were assumed for the shelf-life and 
cost. 
Although the United Kingdom has not accumulated a 
stockpile of near-patient tests, we assumed it to be the same 
size as the AV drug stockpile in the base-case analysis. The 
probability of being tested (test-treat option) was 87% (size 
of stockpile/total ILI cases). 
Costs
As recommended in the United Kingdom, costs were 
analyzed from the perspective of the healthcare provider, 
the National Heath Service (NHS). Future costs and ben-
efi ts were discounted at the current rate of 3.5% per annum 
and all costs were in 2004 pounds sterling (£1 = ≈US$1.8) 
(14,26).
Mean unit costs per GP consultation, hospitalization, 
and A&E attendance for ILI were deduced from standard 
sources (17,19). We assumed that no additional costs were 
associated with death. The costs of complications leading 
to GP consultation or hospitalization were assumed to be 
the same for pandemic infl uenza and nonpandemic ILI.
The unit cost of an AV treatment course was assumed 
to be £16 (16) for the treat-only option and £16.87 (because 
of excess AV drugs) for the test-treat option (fi xed stock-
piles). The unit cost of a near-patient test was assumed to 
be £7 (7), and storage was £1 per unit (AV drug course or 
test) per year for both programs. Administration costs for 
the distribution of AV drugs or near-patient testing by visit-
ing teams or call-in centers were assumed equivalent to the 
mean cost of a home visit by a district nurse, health visitor, 
health care assistant, or practice nurse (£15.75 per test or 
AV drug course) (17). Units were assumed to be procured 
>2 years (1) and replenished at expiration of shelf-life. 
Health Benefi ts
Health benefi ts were assessed by using QALYs. 
QALY loss associated with uncomplicated ILI were calcu-
lated study by O’Brien et al. (20) assuming a normal health 
score of 0.85 (online Appendix Table). QALY loss associ-
ated with the development of complications was assumed 
to be the sum of QALY loss associated with uncomplicated 
ILI and that associated with pneumococcal pneumonia 
(outpatient) because this was the most likely complication 
(21). Similarly, QALY loss associated with hospitaliza-
tion was considered the sum of QALY loss associated with 
uncomplicated ILI and that associated with pneumococcal 
pneumonia (inpatient) (21).
The mean discounted QALY loss associated with pan-
demic infl uenza death was estimated by using age-specifi c 
CFR under the 2 death scenarios and background life expec-
tancy by age weighed by age-adjusted quality-of-life scores 
(online Appendix Table) (27). QALY loss associated with 
noninfl uenza death was assumed to be the same as that asso-
ciated with S. pneumoniae death (a mean discounted QALY 
loss per noninfl uenza death of 6.09 from 1980–2000) (3). 
Base-Case Assumptions
In the base-case analysis, the cost-effectiveness of the 
potential strategies was compared under the assumptions of 
fi xed AV and test stockpiles (14.6 million units), a CAR of 
25%, and a time to pandemic of 30 years. There is no thresh-
old for cost-effectiveness in the United Kingdom, although 
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence will probably 
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Table. Total NHS costs and QALY loss (discounted at 3.5%) resulting from an influenza pandemic occurring in 30 years assuming 
1918 or 1957/69 CFR* 
Treatment program
Pandemic
influenza cases 
(millions)
Pandemic
influenza deaths 
(millions)
Discounted NHS 
costs (million £)
Discounted
QALY loss 
(millions)
Incremental cost per 
QALY (£)
1918 scenario
    No intervention 15 0.344 113 2.23
    Treat only 15 0.236 1,361 1.56 1,861†
    Test-treat 15 0.231 2,356 1.53 31,031‡
1957–69 scenario
    No intervention 15 0.044 113 0.395
    Treat only 15 0.030 1,361 0.303 13,668†
    Test-treat 15 0.030 2,356 0.299 227,896‡
*NHS, National Health Service; QALY, quality-adjusted life year; CFR, case-fatality ratio. 
†Cost per QALY gained over no intervention program.  
‡Cost per QALY gained over treat-only program. 
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reject an intervention on cost-effectiveness grounds if the 
cost per QALY gained is in excess of £25,000–£35,000 
(28). For ease of exposition, we used a simple threshold of 
£30,000 per QALY to defi ne a cost-effective intervention.
Results
Base-Case Analysis (Fixed Stockpiles)
In our base-case model, we estimated that in a pan-
demic, ILI would develop in 28.1% of the population (16.8 
million persons) (including 15 million pandemic infl uen-
za patients). Under the high CFR conditions of the 1918 
scenario, ≈344,000 deaths would occur compared with 
≈44,000 deaths under the 1957/69 scenario (Table). These 
scenarios would result in the loss of  ≈2.2 or 0.4 million dis-
counted QALYs, respectively, with a total discounted cost 
to the NHS of £113 million if no treatment program were 
initiated (no intervention). The treat-only program would 
reduce this loss by 700,000 or 90,000 QALYs at a cost of 
≈£1,900 or £13,700 per QALY gained for the 1918 and 
1957/69 scenarios, respectively, well below the £30,000 
threshold. The test-treat program would further reduce this 
loss slightly by 30,000 or 4,000 QALYs but at a high cost 
of ≈£31,000 or £228,000 per QALY gained over the treat-
only alternative. The test-treat option would be unlikely to 
be considered because cost-effectiveness is highly depen-
dent on the fatality scenario.
Univariate Sensitivity Analysis of the 
Treat-Only Program (Fixed Stockpile)
Because the treat-only program was the most cost-ef-
fective program under both fatality scenarios, we carried 
out a univariate sensitivity analysis of the incremental 
cost-effectiveness of this program to variability in model 
parameters (online Appendix Table). AV drug effi cacy for 
reducing complications and hospitalizations had minimal 
effect on the cost-effectiveness of the treat-only program, 
but this strategy was highly sensitive to AV drug effi cacy 
for reducing death (Figure 2). This was due to the relatively 
high QALY loss associated with pandemic infl uenza death 
(94% and 69% of the total QALY loss for the 1918 and 
1957/69 scenarios, respectively). Because the value of this 
parameter is unclear, further studies of the potential protec-
tive effect of AV drugs against death are essential.
The timing of the pandemic and the discount rate were 
infl uential parameters. However, variation in the timing 
of the epidemic is unlikely to change the recommendation 
that the treat-only strategy is cost-effective. If an epidemic 
occurs in 45 years, the costs per QALY gained would be 
≈£3,800 and £28,000 for the 2 fatality scenarios (discount 
rate of 3.5%), still below the £30,000 threshold. At a dis-
count rate of 6%, the treat-only option would be cost-effec-
tive for up to 30 years.
The effi ciency of AV drug distribution is likely to be 
important. The program would however remain cost-effec-
tive if the probability of receiving AVs within 48 hours did 
not drop below 35% (£3,700 or £27,000 per QALY gained 
for the 1918 and 1957/69 scenarios), respectively.
The treat-only program was slightly more cost-ef-
fective in the summer than the winter or midwinter as the 
probability of pandemic infl uenza being the cause of ILI 
was higher (96%, 89%, and 84%, respectively). Wastage 
(wasted quantities, fraud, theft) of AV drug supplies as 
high as 25% had little effect on cost-effectiveness of the 
treat-only option (Figure 2).
A lower CAR (15%) reduced the cost-effectiveness of 
AV drugs because some of the stockpile would not be used 
(surplus). Increasing the CAR above 25% had no effect on 
programs with fi xed stockpiles because the same number of 
deaths and complications would be prevented at the same 
cost (the proportion of deaths prevented would be reduced, 
but the absolute number would remain the same).
Threshold Conditions for Test-Treat 
Option (Fixed Stockpiles)
For high CARs, where a fi xed AV drug stockpile is less 
than the expected demand (as in the base-case), near-pa-
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Figure 2. Univariate sensitivity analyses of the incremental cost-
effectiveness of the treat only strategy over the no-intervention strategy 
to model parameters under the 1918 scenario (A) and 1957/69 
scenario (B). OR, odds ratio; AV, antiviral; CAR, clinical attack rate; ILI, 
infl uenza-like illness; A&E, accident and emergency department; GP, 
general practitioner; QALY, quality-adjusted life year.
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tient tests could be used to better target therapeutic courses. 
A univariate sensitivity analysis of the incremental cost-
effectiveness of test-treat over treat only to variability in 
the near-patient test parameters, test sensitivity, specifi city, 
unit cost, and shelf-life, was carried out. Under the 1918 
scenario the test-treat strategy would require test sensitiv-
ity to exceed ≈90% (Figure 3, panel A) or a test unit cost 
below £6 or a shelf-life above 3 years (Figure 3, panel B) 
to be considered cost-effective. Test specifi city would have 
little effect on the incremental cost-effectiveness because 
it has no effect on QALY loss. Under the 1957/69 scenario 
test-treat would never cross the cost-effectiveness thresh-
old even with a 100%-sensitive or 100%-specifi c test, a test 
cost as low as £0, or a shelf-life as high as 4 years.  
Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis (Fixed Stockpiles)
Model parameters were varied (online Appendix Table) 
in a probabilistic sensitivity analysis, which suggests that for 
fi xed AV drug and test stockpiles, the probability is high that 
the treat-only option would be cost-effective, irrespective of 
the fatality scenario (Figure 4). The test-treat option would 
result in small QALY gains (and often losses) but at substan-
tial additional costs. The probability of this strategy being 
cost-effective is low compared with the treat-only option, 
particularly for the 1957/69 fatality scenario. 
Incremental Cost-effectiveness during 
a Pandemic Wave (Fixed Stockpiles)
The probability that an ILI case will be due to pandemic 
infl uenza will vary over the time course of a pandemic (as-
sumed to peak between wk 6 and 7 for a wave lasting 15 
wk) (2). Therefore, near-patient testing may be useful during 
early stages of a pandemic when clinical judgment is low 
and inappropriate AV administration is high. The cost-effec-
tiveness of test-treat over a pandemic wave was analyzed.
The AV drug stockpile was assumed to remain fi xed at 
14.6 million courses (1), and the test stockpile was varied 
with the cumulative number of ILI cases expected per week 
of the pandemic wave. Figure 5 shows the total incremental 
cost-effectiveness of the test-treat strategy over treat only 
for each test stockpile for a CAR of 25%. Test-treat would 
be cost-effective (<£30,000 per QALY gained) for test 
stockpiles up to 12.1 million (the expected no. of cumula-
tive ILI cases at wk 8 of a pandemic) under the 1918 sce-
nario. Test-treat may even be considered for test stockpiles 
up to 13.7 million (wk 9 of a pandemic) as the cost-effec-
tiveness was ≈£32,700 per QALY gained. However, under 
the 1957/69 scenario test-treat would not be cost-effective 
at any stage of the pandemic, although it may be considered 
for test stockpiles up to ≈35,000 (wk 2 of a pandemic) as 
the cost was ≈£34,000 per QALY gained. 
For a CAR of 15% (data not shown), test-treat would 
not be cost-effective throughout a pandemic as the AV drug 
stockpile would exceed demand (cumulative ILI cases). For 
a CAR of 35% (data not shown), although test-treat would 
be cost-effective for test stockpiles up to 16.4 million (wk 
8) under the 1918 scenario, it would not be cost-effective 
at any stage of the pandemic under the 1957/69 scenario. 
Therefore in the short-term, stockpiling enough tests for the 
fi rst 2 weeks of a potential infl uenza pandemic (≈35,000 
tests) could help conserve limited AV drug stockpiles. 
However, this is highly dependent on the CAR and CFR. 
Optimal Stockpiling
In the long term, it may be more cost-effective to 
increase stockpiles to cover expected demand (CAR + 
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Figure 3. Univariate sensitivity analyses of the incremental cost-
effectiveness of the test-treat strategy over the treat only strategy 
to A) near-test sensitivity and specifi city and B) near-test unit cost 
and shelf-life. The test-treat program becomes cost-effective below 
the cost-effectiveness threshold (£30,000 per quality-adjusted life 
year [QALY] gained).
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background ILI + wastage). Figure 6 and the online Ap-
pendix Figure (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/
14/2/267-appG.htm) show the expected costs and QALY 
losses under a range of different AV drug and test stockpiles 
and CARs (base-case test characteristics and AV drug ef-
fi cacy assumed). Each point represents 1 scenario (test and 
AV drug stockpile size). Points on the effi ciency line were 
potentially cost-effective strategies. Strategies that increase 
cost but reduce QALY loss (moving from left to right on 
the effi ciency line) should be considered until the slope of 
the line exceeds the threshold of £30,000 per QALY (ef-
fi ciency line ends). For each CAR, this process suggested 
that the optimal strategy was treat only, stockpiling enough 
AV drugs to meet demand (CAR plus background ILI plus 
AV drug wastage). Therefore, for a CAR of 25%, the opti-
mum stockpile was ≈20 million AV drugs only (Figure 6) 
because the expected number of ILI cases would be 16.8 
million (15 million of which would be pandemic infl uenza) 
and the expected AV drug wastage would be 2.2 million. 
The test-treat strategies were never on the effi ciency line, 
even for a perfect test (100% sensitivity and specifi city), 
because they resulted in similar QALY loss as treat only 
but at increased costs. Indeed, when the size of the AV 
drug stockpile exceeded the demand, test-treat resulted in 
increased QALY loss (if the test is not 100% sensitive), 
because some true pandemic infl uenza case-patients would 
be denied treatment even though there was a surplus of AV 
drug courses.
Discussion 
This study demonstrates that stockpiling AV drugs for 
a treat-only program is likely to be a cost-effective strategy 
in preparation for a potential infl uenza pandemic, even if 
the pandemic occurs many years from now, assuming that 
AV drugs provide some protection against death. However, 
under current UK planning assumptions (CAR 25%), the 
AV stockpile would be too small (at 14.6 million courses) 
to treat all cases of ILI. Near-patient testing is unlikely to 
be a cost-effective approach to conserving AV stocks but 
might be considered early in a pandemic. A more cost-ef-
fective strategy would be to increase the stockpile of AV 
drugs. Since CARs in excess of 30% have been observed in 
pandemics (29), increasing the stockpile to cover this pos-
sibility may be both prudent and cost-effective. Indeed, ex-
panding the stockpile of AV drugs to encompass the whole 
UK population (≈60 million) might even be acceptable 
(≈£6,500 per QALY gained over a no intervention strategy 
for the 1918 scenario under base-case assumptions).
Stockpiling AVs  is a cost-effective option, even though 
some benefi ts have been ignored (e.g., possible reduction in 
CAR if widespread and prompt treatment is offered) (30). 
Furthermore, additional benefi ts could be derived from us-
ing AV drug stockpiles close to their expiration dates to 
treat epidemic infl uenza patients. Finally, the reduction 
in illness and death that may result from widespread AV 
drug use is likely to bring benefi ts to other sectors of the 
economy.
This study focused on mass treatment strategies be-
cause this is the policy of the United Kingdom and other 
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Figure 4. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis of the incremental cost-
effectiveness of the treat-only over the no-intervention strategy and 
the test-treat strategy over the treat-only strategy for the A) 1918 
and B) 1957/69 death scenarios (1,000 iterations). Cost-effective 
strategies lie to the right of the cost-effectiveness threshold 
(£30,000 per quality-adjusted life year [QALY] gained). 
Figure 5. Incremental cost-effectiveness of the test-treat strategy 
over the treat-only strategy during a pandemic wave (antiviral [AV] 
stockpile = 14.6 million courses, test stockpile = number of cumulative 
infl uenza-like [ILI] cases, clinical attack rate = 25%). QALY, quality-
adjusted life year.
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countries (31). However, strategies targeting those at high-
er risk of complications or death would be more cost-effec-
tive provided the delivery costs are similar and AV drugs 
are as effective in these groups.
The main caveat to an AV drug stockpiling strategy is 
the uncertainty concerning the effi cacy of AV drugs against 
the next strain of pandemic infl uenza, particularly effi cacy 
against infl uenza-related deaths. Clearly, estimation of this 
important parameter should be a priority if governments 
are to commit large resources to mitigating the effect of 
an uncertain pandemic occurring at an unknown point in 
the future.
Use of AV drugs on the scale anticipated may create 
a selective pressure (any factor that leads to preferential 
survival of organisms with specifi c traits) for the emer-
gence of AV drug resistance. In this case, large-scale use 
of AVs could lead to the preferential survival of fl u viruses 
that are resistant to AVs. However, studies to date indi-
cate that resistance to oseltamivir in infl uenza virus strains 
occurs rarely (32,33) and that such mutations may have a 
fi tness cost in terms of impaired growth and transmissibil-
ity (34,35). Nevertheless, recent reports suggest reduced 
susceptibility to oseltamivir in some currently circulating 
strains of avian infl uenza (H5N1) with pandemic potential 
(36–38). Clearly this may reduce the effectiveness of an 
oseltamivir stockpiling program, although AV drugs might 
still delay pandemic spread to allow vaccine development 
(39). Further epidemiologic and modeling studies of the 
potential effect of oseltamivir resistance on viral fi tness and 
drug effectiveness are required.
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